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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER USED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellee (hereinafter "Karen" or "Respondent") claims Petitioner uses the 
wrong standard of review because the Court dismissed this case, as it "was not persuaded 
by the evidence" presented by Petitioner, as opposed to a failure to present a prima facie 
case. However, Respondent mixes the directions in Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (hereinafter "URCP") with the clarification provided in Sorenson v. 
Sorenson, to come to this conclusion. 783 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah App. 1994). 
Rule 41 (b) URCP, governing involuntary dismissals, provides that defendant 
"may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has 
shown no right to relief. The court may then "render judgment against the plaintiff or 
may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence." Rule 41(b) 
URCP. Then the rule says: "If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)" and explains further 
that a dismissal under subsection (b) is a dismissal on the merits. Rule 41(b) URCP. 
As stated by Respondent, the court, in Sorenson v. Sorenson, does clarify that dismissal 
under Rule 41 (b) URCP is appropriate in two circumstances and each has a different 
standard of review. 783 P.2d at 1144. "Failure to establish a prima facie case . . . is a 
question of law", which is "reviewed for correctness." Id, A "clearly erroneous standard 
[is appropriate] because the trial court was not persuaded by the evidence." Id, 
Respondent then concludes, without basis that, in this case, the court received the 
evidence "but was not convinced by it" and therefore the correct standard is "clearly 
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erroneous". Respondent's brief, p.8. However, the court made no findings, which 
indicate that it dismissed either because it believed Petitioner failed to make a prima facie 
case or because it was unconvinced by the evidence presented. 
A prima facie case is defined as the "establishment of a legally required rebuttable 
presumption; a party's production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the 
fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (7th ed. 
1999). In fact, in the Order of Dismissal in this case, prepared by Respondent, it states 
"[tjhere was no evidence to show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live 
with Mr. Gerkin. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was cohabitating 
with Mr. Gerken." Further, Respondent's Order indicates "the Court granted a directed 
verdict". R.443-442. (Attached as Exhibit "A"). This means the court believed 
Petitioner did not present a prima facie case, for which the standard is reviewed for 
correctness. 
In Sorensen, the court noted that the question in that case was the "existence of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract as a question of fact." Sorenson v. Sorenson, 783 
P.2d at 1144. This would necessitate a clearly erroneous standard. Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah App. 1996). However, the question in this case is 
the termination of alimony, which is "a mixed question of fact and law." Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). While the court should "defer to the trial 
court's factual findings unless they are show to be clearly erroneous, [it should] review 
its ultimate conclusion for correctness". Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 
(Utah App. 1996). This is because the "ultimate conclusion" is a question of law. 
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Therefore, while the factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, the 
"ultimate conclusion" should be reviewed for correctness. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 
P.2dat 160. 
II. PETITIONER MARSHALLED THE APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE 
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not marshal all the evidence necessary under 
Rule 24 (a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respondent then proceeds to 
include a litany of "evidence" which she claims was presented at trial and not 
"marshaled" by the Petitioner. 
"The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which 
tends to support the findings . . . " Bell v. Elder, 782 p.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 
1989)(emphasis in original). Marshalling "provides the appellate court the basis from 
which to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal." 
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Utah courts have identified many cases in which the efforts in marshalling 
were inadequate. Some appellants merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts of 
trial testimony in support of their own position, conveniently omitting negative facts. 
See, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1999); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 
1209, 1218 (Utah App. 1999). Some parties incorrectly state marshaled "facts" to try to 
improve their position. See, Johnson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm 'n. 842 P.2d 
910, 912 (Utah App. 1992)(appellant stated he missed no work days though record 
showed he missed at least nine days). Finally, some appellants merely reargue the same 
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case made before the trial court. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999). 
See, generally, Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Revised, 12 
UTAH BAR JOURNAL, 8, 13 (1999); Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate 
Review, 8 UTAH BAR JOURNAL, 9, 13 (1994). 
Respondent overstates the burden somewhat in claiming Petitioner "falls short of 
meeting the marshaling threshold". Respondent's brief, p. 11. Most of the "evidence" 
which Respondent claims Petitioner did not provide to this court is not direct evidence of 
a lack of co-habitation, but instead, rebuttal to evidence put on by Petitioner. This 
rebuttal evidence propounded by Respondent does not move a fact forward so much as 
offer an explanation for some of the evidence presented by Petitioner. There is no 
requirement that "marshaling the evidence" forces Petitioner to repeat all the hypothetical 
explanations that Respondent's counsel may create in cross-examination for the evidence 
presented by Petitioner. 
For example, Respondent claims Petitioner should have included the evidence that 
when the private investigator testified he never saw anyone or Karen's [Respondent's] 
truck at the Cedar View house, upon cross examination, he acknowledged the truck could 
have been in the garage. Respondent's brief, p. 13. In fact, when not seen in front of the 
house, the truck could have been anywhere else in the world, including where 
Respondent's counsel suggested, but that suggestion does not have to be included in 
Petitioner's marshaling of the evidence against him. Then Respondent presents a litany 
of the things the witness did not see, again based upon counsel's cross-examination and 
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presentation of hypothetical situations. Respondent's brief, p. 14. All possible scenarios 
raised by counsel in cross-examination need not be included in the marshaling standard. 
Further, other "evidence" Respondent claims was omitted is evidence that carries 
no weight on the relevant issues. For example, Respondent criticizes Petitioner for 
omitting the fact that Respondent still had toiletries of hers in her own home; however, 
this was never disputed. Respondent's brief, p. 12. Nor is it particularly relevant. The 
fact that other individuals very occasionally drove Respondent's truck was also 
undisputed. Respondent's brief, p. 13. However, the fact that "Mr. Richard 
acknowledged that Karen's truck could have been in the garage at Cedar View" was, in 
fact, included in Petitioner's brief at p. 9. 
Respondent mischaracterizes the "evidence" cited by Petitioner in her claims that 
he has not marshaled adequately. For example in asserting that Dane Gerkin took the 
truck whenever he wanted to, she claims Petitioner cited to a statement of his counsel at 
525:144:24 to 525:145:1, rather than to Respondent's contrary testimony. However, 
Respondent ignores the fact that there were actually three citations to that fact reference, 
and the other references all refer to other witnesses besides Karen Sursa's self-serving 
testimony. Further, the other trial testimony referenced was clear that Karen Sursa 
frequently allowed Dane Gerkin to drive her truck without her. R.525;91:5-17; 525:92:2-
3; 525:144:24-145:1. 
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not include the evidence of the "very limited 
sexual contact with Mr. Gerkin". Respondent's brief, p. 16. However, Petitioner's brief 
states, as does Respondent's brief, that Karen testified they had a sexual relationship for 
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the first few months but now the relationship was platonic. Petitioner's brief, p. 10. The 
fact that Respondent stayed with Dane Gerkin sometimes because she was "dependent on 
him for health or other reasons." is also referenced in Petitioner's brief, though as a fact 
that supports Petitioner's claim, not the Respondent's. Therefore, it was not included in 
the marshaling section. Petitioner's brief, p.20. 
Finally, Respondent attempts to claim that deposition testimony, which was not 
introduced at trial, was evidence that should have been included in the marshalling of 
facts against Petitioner's position. Respondent's brief, p. 12. This is outside the scope of 
the marshaling requirement. 
II. PETITIONER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
COHABITATION 
Petitioner alleges that the evidence, which Respondent submitted, at trial, did not 
establish that she cohabitated with Dane Gerkin. She claims she and Mr. Gerkin did not 
share a common residence, had an "abbreviated sexual involvement", and did not share 
expenses. Respondent's brief, p.24-28. 
As stated, the rule for terminating alimony consists of showing "the former 
spouses is residing with a person . . . and engaging in sexual contact with the person," 
based upon an objective, not subjective, standard. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah 
App. 1995). Cohabitation is comprised of. . . two elements: (1) common residency and 
(2) sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 
159, 161 n.l (Utah App. 1996). 
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A. THE PARTIES SHARED A COMMON RESIDENCE 
Petitioner alleges the parties did not share a common residence because there was 
no evidence that "either kept furniture or clothing at the other's home other than the 
clothing Ms. Sursa had on the occasion she was recuperating from an illness at Mr. 
Gerkin's home." Respondent's brief, p. 19. She further justifies this occasion because 
she was allegedly "recuperating from an illness . . . just even occupying one of his beds 
but was lying on the floor." Respondent's brief, p. 19. This sanitization of the 
circumstances of this incident is a remarkable mischaracterization of the evidence 
presented to the trial court. In fact, Karen was lying on the floor wearing underwear and 
Dane Gerkin's T-shirt. R. 525:22:23; 525:41:5. Further, "her bra was on the floor with 
her pants". R.525:22:23-24. Her "pursue, her cigarettes, her keys, and her clothes and 
her shoes" were also there, though not on her. R.525:23:12-13. Dane Gerkin was 
dressed in "red cut-off sweats and a green T-shirt." R.525:22:15. They had made a bed 
on the floor with a blanket belonging to Karen. R.525:23:7-9: 525:22:20-21. 
Karen alleges she and Dane Gerkin only occasionally ate together, and "overnight 
visits were rare". Respondent's brief, p. 19-20. However, she is selectively presenting 
her own self-serving testimony in support of these claims, while ignoring the balance of 
the evidence presented. 
Karen was unemployed and spent most of her time at the home of Dane Gerkin as 
evidenced by her conversations with her daughter. R.525:22:6. Her truck was usually 
seen at his home regularly for over a year and rarely seen at her own home. R. 525:93:23 
-94:8; 525:71:15-21; 525:73:12. Her children could usually only get ahold of her on 
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her cell phone, while she was at Dane Gerkin's. R. 525:25:23-25; R.525:27:9-23. Karen 
did pay some of Dane's expenses, though she tried to claim it was in exchange for 
pictures he drew for her. R: 525:35:14-20. Dane cared for Karen, as a husband would 
care for a wife. This was particularly evidence when she preferred going home with him 
instead of her children after her trip to the hospital for an overdose. R. 525:31:4-10; 
525:31:23-32:23. They ate at Dane's home an unknown number of times, and also went 
out to eat publicly "once or twice a week", and were seen together all over town, 
frequently. R. 525:120:18-22. This evidence is consistent with the facts in Sigg v. Sigg 
and Pendleton v. Pendleton to show a shared residence. 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995); 
918 P.2d 159 (Utah App. 1996). 
B. THE PARTIES HAD A SEXUAL "CONJUGAL" RELATIONSHIP 
Karen appears to acknowledge that she had sexual contact with Dane Gerkin but 
that because it was "for only a two-month time period" by her testimony, it was not the 
type of sexual contact requisite to prove cohabitation. Respondent's brief, p.23. She 
distinguishes this from the few months of sexual contact present in Pendleton, since the 
parties there were still involved in sexual contact at the time of trial. Id., citing 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P. 2d at 160. 
There is no legal basis for Karen's claim that if sexual contact has allegedly 
terminated prior to trial, cohabitation did not exist. In fact, it is counter-intuitive, since 
many parties would cease the actions for which they have been brought before the court, 
after the initiation of litigation. Further, Karen's claims the relationship changed from a 
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sexual one to a more of a "friendship" because of her illness, but even then they spent the 
night at each other's home and that Dane Gerkin took care of her. R. 525:146:2. 
"Conjugal rights" are defined as "the rights of married persons which include 'the 
enjoyment of association, sympathy, confidence, domestic happiness, the comforts of 
dwelling together . . . as well as the intimacies of domestic relations.'" BARRON'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 88 (2nd ed. 1984). This defines exactly the relationship of Karen and 
Dane Gerkin, as evidenced by the extensive testimony presented at trial. 
Respondent claims that she does not have the burden to disprove sexual contact 
because the statute changed and the "cases that he relies on were based on a former 
version of the statute that provided for that split in he burden." Respondent's brief, 
p. 17n. 1. She further alleges. "[T]he present statute now clearly puts that burden on Mr. 
Sursa." Id. In fact, as noted in Petitioner's original brief, (p. 17), the statute changed in 
1995 and the cases relied on primarily are Sigg v. Sigg, and Pendleton v. Pendleton, 
which were ruled upon in 1995 and 1996 respectively. 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah App. 
1995); 918 P.2d 159, 161 n.l (Utah App. 1996). 
III. THE COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD 
It is clear from the court's statements, in this case that it believed that the parties 
were supporting each other and had ongoing sexual contact. It identified Dane Gerkin as 
"like a gigolo" but that, obviously based upon its subjective opinion, Karen Sursa would 
clearly "not want to spend the rest of her life with somebody like that." R.525:159:17-19. 
The court further recognized from the evidence presented that, in addition to above 
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description of the parties' relationship, Karen was "dependent on him" [Dane Gerkin]. 
R.525:259:16. Based upon these findings, together with the appropriate standard, the 
court should have concluded that Karen Sursa and Dane Gerkin had cohabitated, thus 
terminating Petitioner's alimony obligation. 
IV. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS 
FEES REVERSED 
The lower court ordered Petitioner to pay $14,656.63 for Respondent's attorney 
fees. This amount has been deposited with the court pending the outcome of the 
appellate court. R.512-514. This court should reverse the ruling of the lower court on 
the issue of cohabitation. If it does so, then the court should also reverse its ruling on 
attorneys' fees and Petitioner should be entitled to a return of these funds. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument Petitioner respectfully requests that 
the court reverse the trial court and conclude that Respondent, Karen Sursa, cohabitated 
with Dane Gerkin. Based thereon, alimony should therefore, be terminated and Petitioner 
should be entitled to retain the funds paid into the court for Respondent's attorney fees. 
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DATED this / Q day of February 2005. 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C. 
BY: 
LOTTIED. FOWLKE 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH D. SURSA, ) 
) ORDER OF 
Petitioner, ) DISMISSAL 
vs. ) 
KAREN J. SURSA, ) Civil No. 004000114 DA 
Respondent. ) Judge John R. Anderson 
The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial 
on September 22, 2003. The Petitioner, Kenneth E. Sursa, was 
present with his attorney Bryan Sidwell. The Respondent, Karen J. 
Sursa, was present with her attorney Clark B Allred. The 
Petitioner called several witnesses and then rested. The 
Respondent moved for a directed verdict and requested that the 
Petitioner's petition be dismissed. The Court having heard the 
evidence and argument from counsel and having reviewed the case law 
and other information provided granted the motion and based thereon 
makes and enters the following order. 
1. The issue before the Court was whether the Court should 
terminate the Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony on the claim 
that the Respondent was cohabitating with Dane Gerken. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(10), the Petitioner 
who is seeking to terminate alimony, had the burden to establish 
that the Respondent, Karen J. Sursa, was cohabitating with Dane 
Gerken. 
3. The evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Petitioner, shows that the Respondent and Mr. Gerken had a 
friendship and a dating relationship. There was no evidence to 
show an intent or desire by the Respondent to move in or live with 
Mr. Gerken. The evidence did not establish that the Respondent was 
cohabitating with Mr. Gerken. The facts did not meet either the 
residency or the sexual relationship requirements, required by the 
case law to establish cohabitation. 
4. The Petitioner dismissed his alternative claim to 
reduce alimony based on a change of financial circumstances prior 
to the trial. 
5. Because the Court granted a directed verdict evidence 
was not received on the issue of reimbursement of legal fees. The 
Respondent had submitted to the Court an affidavit regarding the 
attorney fees and costs she has incurred thru September 15, 2 003. 
The Court Therefore Orders as follows: 
2 
